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ABSTRACT
This paper develops andtests a three—equation si.niltaneous nodelof
OSHAenforcenent behavior,industrialcatpliarice and tcrkplace injuries.The
enforcerrent equation is based on the assunption that OSHA actsas a political
institution that gains support through the transfer of wealth franfinns to
enplc'ees;the enpiricalresults are largely consistent with this notion.
Contrary to previous tcrk, we find that OSHA enforcemEnt efforts have, indeed,
had a statistically significant inpact on industrialcaipliance arid, further,
that this campliance has led to a statistically significant decreasein ssvrker
injuries. The point estimate of the elasticity ofthe lost v.orkdayrate with
respect to the OSHA inspection rate is -.04.
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I. Introduction
Passage of the occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970 raised
expectations that both the nuriter and severity of injuries attributable to
our nation' s workplaces would be curtailed. One of the Act' s authors was
even so optimistic as to express hope that by 1980 injuriesild be reduced
50 percent or nore.' Unfortunately, existing evidence does not support so
sanguine a view of regulatory effectiveness. In the first place, after a
decline intheearly 1970's, workplace fatalities have inrecentyears resulted
anuardtrend. Other injury data provide even nore azrbiguous irplications
for the efficacy of regulation; the ratio of injury cases to all workers has
fol].od the trend infatalities,falling thenrising,while the ratio of lost
workdays caused by injuriestoall workers has actually increased every year
since 1970.2 l'tredisturbingly,an extended series of professional studies
have failed to find any statistically significant i.rrpact on national injury
rates due toactivitiesby the occupational Safety and Health Administration,
orcsiia3Indeed,when thesestudies find occasional specifications
whichindicate, statistically significantOSHA influence, that:
influence is as often estimated to increase injuries as it is to
Thisproject was supported by grants fran theAlfred P. Sloan Foundation,
theFacultyPa search Rind ofthe Graduate SchoolofBusiness,Coluithia Univer-
sity, and the Research Board of the University of Illinois at Urbana-thanpaign.
ndeloff(1979), p. 82.
2U. S. DepartnentofLabor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "occupational
Injuries and Illnesses: Sumnary," various years.
3DiPietro(1976), bndeloff (1976, 1979), attith (1976) ,andViscusi(1979).
Recentstudieswithnore optimistic findingsincludeCake and Gantschi (1981)
andSnith (1979).—2—
decreasetan.4 The authors of this series of studies have argued thatany
niid-1970's declines in injury rates were due not to regulation, but to labor
market forces related to the contarporaneous recession. On the basis of
these findings, an apparent consensus has eirerged anong econmists that (in
the vnrds of Albert Nichols and Richard Zeckbauser):
The evidence available to date is trx weak to support a flat
statenent that OSHP. has ne nothing for cocupational safety.
It seems reasonably certain, however, that the gains have not
been major, for had they been so, even the crude neasures
available '.culd have been able to detect then.5
Th'odistinctexplanations for the apparent failure of OSHA toaffect
injury rates havebeenput forward in the literature. The first is that, due
to limited statutory and budgetary authority fran Congress, OSHA is unable to
caipel industrial carpliance with its own standards. Advocates of this posi-
tion point to the pitifully stall level of OSHA fines, and to the snail nunber
of firms that will actually be inspected. For exanple, in 1975, the average
fine per violation anounted toonly$26 while the average nurber of inspections
perfinnwas only .02inplyingan expected fine perviolationof 52 •6ftr
this perspectivethen, noncaipliance is the rt of OSHA 's failure. A second
arguient is that the OSHctitselfis flawed, enphasizing standards for capi-
tal uiprentwhennost accidents infactarecausedby ccztplex epidemiological
interactions of labor, equipient, and the workplace environnent. Since OSHA
standardsaddressonlypart oftheprcblen,thesestandards can have atbest
minimaleffect.7
4see the discussion in Zeckhauser and Nichols (1978),pp. 215—216.
5Nichols and Zeckhauser (1977),p. 55.
andNichols (1978), pp. 205208.
7Mendeloff(1976), pp. 85—87 and Zecithauser arid Nichols (1978) ,pp.189—191.—3—
Despite the thviais policy inçortance of testing these two hypotheses,
rio econczttic analysis has yet been conducted of the nature, deternunants,
and consequences of industrial nonccmpliance with workplace safety standards.
Previousstudies of OSFIA 's irrpact on workplace safety have instead directly
examined statistical links between OSHA enforcatent and industrial accident
rates, and are thus incapable of distinguishing anong causes of the apparent
regulatory inefficacy. We propose an alternate approach which explicitly
addresses the issue of industrial noncaxpliance and alls consideration of
three separate hypotheses:(a) that HA enforcen'ent efforts generate can-
pliance by finns and reduced injuries for workers, (b) that OSHA enforcenEnt
efforts lead to widespread ccztpliance, but that conformance with what are
nostly safety standards for equiptent has little effect on injury rates, and
(c) that OS1. attains neither carpliance fran firms nor reduced injuries.
There are several reasons for believing a reexamination of OSHA '5
ijipacton injuries to be fruitful at this tiiie. In the first place several
factors suggest that the "noncaipliancehypothesis" discussedabove nay be
misleading if not caipletely false. Alongside studies suggesting OSHA '5
failureto achieve carp liance due to inadequate enforcenEnt are other studies
indicating that OSHA ixtposes enornous financial burdens on industry. CUe
aich report estimated OSHA catpliance costs of alnost $3.7 billion a year
Clearly both sets of studies cannot sinultaneously be correct. Further, the
ncrrj-wide frequency of inspections cited above is so la., precisely because
the bulk of our nation' s five million workplaces is caiprised of snail retail
and service establishnents that are in little need of safety regulation. OSHA
8weidenbaum and DeFina (1978).—4—
has sensibly concentrated its resources on rwe hazardous and larger firms,
with the result that relevant firms face far higher probabilities of inspec-
tion. The average inspection rate for all manufacturing establishnents in
the sauple used for this study was in fact about 30 percent during the mid-
1970's. A single firm, General tttors, was actually inspected 614 separate
tints between 1972 and 1975. Further, the average penalty per violation is
so low only because about 70 percent of all violations are "non—serious,"
carrying average penalties of only $3. Serious and repeat violations carry
average penalties of $450, while willful violations receive average penalties
of $5400.10 OSHA fines nay thus prow quite substantial, as Dupont discovered
in 1976 when during a single inspection it was cited for $21,000.11 Apparently,
CElIA enforcenent is not quite the charade its ntst severe critics have por-
trayed, and the extent to which the agency achieves industrial carpliance is
an ewpirical, and open issue.
A second reason for reconsideration of OSHA 's i.npact arises fran a
problan enbedded in many previous st.dies of this issue--sirrultaneity of
injuries and inspections. By its own accounts, CElIA does not randanly inspect
industries but rather explicitly targets for enforcatent those firms with high
accident rates—a so-called worst-first strategy. This targeting of enforcenent
has also occurred in special OSHA procedures such as the Target Industry Program
or TIP. In light of this pervasive targeting, any igative enforcenent effects
could sell be swanped by positive accident effects on enforcenent.
asiness WeEk (1976).
3•0CGHA "Report Nuirber SPOI," ndntograph, May 22, 1979.
"Business Week (1976).—5—
Qthe basis of the above considerations, we have clrjsen to estimate
a three-equation model of OSHAenforcenent of its safety standards,
industrial cctpliance withthesestandards, and workplace injuries. This
procedure at once corrects for the sinultaneity problan of past studies while
enabling separate testings of the "noncczpliance" and "inefficacy" hypotheses
advanced by CSHA critics. In Part II of the paper the ntdel is developed,
while Part III describes the data that were used to test the hypotheses. The
results are presented in Part IV and caic lus ions and policy iitplications
are given in Part V.
II.frbdel
A.OSHA thforcaient
The nost basic function of OSHA inspections is to reallocate wealth.
Inspections serve to force industrial ccmpliance with OSHA standards, and this
ccupliance reduces producer wealth while increasing the safety, hence total
personal wealth of workers. OSHA 's behavior in effecting this transfer sknild
conform to that predicted by the econanic theory of regulation, as developed
by Peltznan, Stigler, and others.12 Essential elenents of this theory are
expected diminishing political returns fran wealth transfer (due to diminish-
ing marginal support by workers and increasing marginal opposition by firms)
along with the expectation that intensities of support and opposition vary
directly with the organizati.onal concentration of workers and firms (due to
diseconanies in cart ination of nuierous stall groups). Effectively, we propose
12Peltn (1976), Stigler (1971), Posner (1971), Jordan (1972), and
Becker (1978).—6—
that the relative of csiienforcenentefforts situld conform to
that predict.aI by tie peltntan theory, and thus that analysis of these
patterns provides a test of validity for this theory.
OSHA will allocate inspections anong industries in order to maximize
net political support (NPS), defined as the difference between support of
workers (SE) and position (or zn-support) of finns (NF). For each in-
dustry, net political support per finn is a function of the prthabiity that
any finn, hence any collection of workers, will be inspected:




NPSF =netpolitical support per firm
EF =enployeesper firm
CE =costof violations ner worker
C =costof violation avoidance per firm
OE =extentof worker organization
OF =extentof firm organization
WE=workerwealth
WF =corporatewealth







cEVFAE >0 a'VF,K C0
SEOE <0 >0
SE#CE,WE >0 NF.;.q c0
All variables defined as •E are on a per employee basis and all variables
defined as •F are on a per establishment ("firm") basis.
Worker support for OSHA enforcement (SE) is a decreasing function of
the violation rate, since more numerous violations increase (atan increasing
rate) the cost ijrçosed on workers fran accidents (CE). Corporateopposition
(NF) is also a decreasing function of violations since ccmpliance costs(a')
decrease (but at an attenuated rate) as violations are allowed to increase.
Support and opposition are functions additionally of organization and wealth
in accordance with the econcznic th&'ry of regulation, in ways that will be
made explicit by the discussion beli. We note in passing that efficient
inspection rates would mininize the swu of worker and corporate costs of
violations per firm (CE+a').
basuratent of either the support or opposition functions in saie
systanatic cardinal pr cedure would represent an extremely difficult task.
Fortunately, measurement of these political functions is unnecessary to gen-
erate predictions for relative enforcene.nt efforts by OSHA. Using classic
econrinic methodology, carparative statics results can be obtained simply by
examination of first-order conditions for maximization of net political
support in each industry:
(4) SECECEr,JIVFIF
=cFFVFWIFwhich is achieved by equalityofmarginal support and marginal opposition.
Note that this specification of the first-order conditions pre sines that
politically optimal inspection frequencies are attained in each industry,
hence for the econany as a whole. This will occur when the U.S. Congress
adjusts OSHA enforcerrent resources so that maximization of net political
support occurs without an artificial "budget" constraint. In view of the
great annual variability of total OSHA inspections, the presunption of no
artificial constraint ssould appear reasonable.
Several, basic ccuparative statics results can be derived frau this
first order condition:
a)Firm Size
The concentration of enployees into larger firms affects marginal
political support in two ways. In the first place, increasing finn size,
while holding violations per firm constant, dilutes the inpact of these
violations. The resulting lor violation rate on apererployee basis has
lower marginal cost for crkers and hence leads to lower marginal, support.
A second offsetting effect arises fran the organizational effects presuned
by the econanic theory of regulation. flip loyees concentrated into a hand-
ful of finns. are easier to politically organize than an equivalent nirber of
enployees that are scattered over nunexous stall finns. Because the like ii—
hood of effective political support is greater fran wrkers of large firms,
marginal support generated by an inspection will be higher ceteris paribus
for enforcatent actions at these large firms. Using the inplicit function
theorem with ecpation (4), it can be shown that
5 — E;(S,EF) ()c(1F1 EF) —c(S',IF) —e(N'—IFJ—9—
where (a,b) denotes the elasticity of a with respect to b,
S'isdefined as marginalpoliticalsupport for an inspection (the
leftbath side of uation (4)), and N' is defined as marginal political oppo-
sition (the right band side of (4)).By the second ordercondition for
maximization of (4),thedenominator of (5)isnegative. Because of the
offsetting nature of the "dilution" effect and the effect of
increasing firm size, the nurterator and hence £(IF,EF) are unsigned. If
the organizational effect dominates, then this elasticity will be positive.
b)Organization
A central conclusion of the economic theory of regulation is that
organized interests receive the greatest per capita wealth transfer. Ftan
the worker side, an increase in effective or potential organization by
errployees thifts uards the political support function, giving the elasticity;
(6 (IF
— —c(S',OE) £ —
e(S',IF) —c'(N',IF)
t..thich isunairbigtuslypositive. Apart frau firm size,relevantneasures of
existingorpotentialorganization include:
—CE,the percentage ofatployeesunionized
-GFOHBF,the geographic concentration ofworkers,neasured by a
herfindah]. index across states
— the occupational concentration of workers, neasured by a
herfindahl index ross occupation categories.
An increase in any of these neasures of concentration will increase marginal
political support and thus the inspection rate. Fbr previous use of worker
berfindahl indices in a similar context, see the study by Borjas (1980).
tilecarparable caiparative statics results for the extent of corporate— 10—
organizationexist, we have been unable in the context of this study to
nea sure the independent organization of finns (as opposed to the sinul-
taneous concentration of both firms and errployees).
M additional organizational effect, predicted less by the econanic
theory of regulation than by standard political science, arises fran the
fact that rkers in the District of Columbia do not have directrepresen-
tation by a voting rrerber of Congress, and hence are incapable of direct
political support for OS HA. The folldng variable should thus have a
negative elasticity with the inspection rate:
-D,percentage of workers in the District of Colurrbia
c)Ncrcarpliance
Many industries would be largely in caipliance with OSHA standards even
in the absence of enforcnt activity, sinply because their technology
involves little capital or few practices which can be regulated. For these
"naturally complying" industries, the ft of catpliance is relatively low and
hence the extent of caipliance is large. At ajuivalent inspectionrates, a
"naturally nonccap lying" industry will provide greater wealth transfer than
a "naturally couplying" industry, as in the latter industry practices
will remain largely unchanged by OSHA. Jny increase in noncaipliance by an
industry because of an exogenous shift upwards in the marginal cost of
caxpliance inplies an increase in the potential for wealth transfer due to
regulation. Thus both marginal support and marginal opposition will increase
as the extent of norcczipliance increases due to exogenous factors. These po-
litical effects offset each other, and prevent signing of the elasticity of
inspections with regard to K, a technology factor that neasures the extent of
"natural nonccrpl iance." Fran (4) and the inplicit function theoren, this
elasticity is:— 11—
(7) (IF K) ——[c(s', K)—c(N',K) —
Lc(s', IF) — c(N',IF)
Note that if marginal support and narginaJ. opposition increase in the sane
proportions when noncapliance increases, then the elasticity in(7) will
be zero.
d)Wealth Effects
A second distinctive i.iiplication of the economic theory of regulation
(along with organizational effects) arises frau the presuried diminishing
marginal support and increasing marginal opposition to wealth transfer. If
workerssatiate in diminished accidents (increased wealth) due to OSHA
enforcenent and hence provide lower marginal support, then itisreasonable
to expect such satiation and diminished marginal support ifsaieother,
exogenous factor decreases accidents. In his exposition of the economic
theory of regulation, Peltzrnan adopts the iitplicit assumption that:
(8)dSE_-dsE
dWE
with a similar assumption for opposition per firm, corporate costs, and
corporate wealth. This assunption is prcbably tco strong as itisdubious
that workers support (ERA sinply because accident rates are laandoppose
the agency because accidents occur frequently. Nonetheless, the effects in
(8)should be of equivalent sign, even ifnot ofthe sane magnitude. Hence
wehave:
9 IF — —c(S',AE)
()c( —
c(S',IF) —c(N',IF)
whichis positive. Note fran (9)thatifc(S', AE) equalsc(S',OE) then
byccatparison of (5)and(9)wewould have— 12—
(10)e(I.F, EF) = c(IF,PIE) =eCEF,AF)
and OSHA will select relative inspection intensities on the basis of accidents
per finn (1W), as has been suggested by previous research.13
Turningto the corporate side, just as finns satiate in regulatory
relief if enforcement is cut back, so an exogenous increase in wealth should
produce a shift (decrease) in marginal opposition carparable to that produced
by enforcenent reductions. In elasticity form:
(11)(IF WF) — e(N',WF)
C —
c(S',IF) —c(N',IF)
which is eçectedly positive. The rate of return on assets (i.e. profits)
will be used in this study as• a proxy for corporate wealth.
e)Information
The probability of worker support in each industry will be greater if
workers are informed about the nature of OSHA activities and the extent of
potential wealth transfers. S'thile worker information is endogenously pro-
duced, largely by worker organizations, in one case it is possible to directly
rreasure the political knowledge of employees as regards CElIA machanisms.
By law, OSHA operates a fontal caiplaint procedure whereby employees may
trigger inspections if they report workplace hazards. Workers who use this
procedure are at least moderately infonlEd about OSHA, at least moderately
value its activities, and are unafraid to seek inpit into decisions by a
national agency. such workers are exactly those most likely to provide effec-
tive political support for the agency. Therefore:
13Zechauser and Nichols,p. 206.— 13—
(12(IF alP — e(S',alP)
C )c(S',IF)—c(N',IF)
where alp conplaints per enplayee.
By its own argunents, CElIA responds to virtually every ccmplaint by conduct-





whereC/I =proportionof caiplaint inspections.
If OSHA does not adjust non-ccmplaint inspections in response to the cap laint
rate, then c (IF, alP) will equal the proportion of catpla..int inspections
(about .05). If instead, other inspections increase with the ccrplaint rate,
then c (IF, a4P) will be larger.
B.Industrial pliance with CElIA Standards
Firms will elect to violate OSEA. standards whenever such noriccrpliance
is prvfit-naxinizing. Even apart frau OSHA enforcerent efforts, the level of
noncczpliance by a finn will have several distinct effects on profits. Cn the
one hand a novenent towards ccatpliance nay require costly capital investients
and changes in work patterns which add to production costs. Q the other hand,
greater caipliance presumably results in feser injuries and hence the firm
shaild have izcreased profits fran fev.er lost or restricted work days and
smaller wage prernia to ccrpensate for job-related risks. This iiiplies that
in the absence of OSHA enforcetent activities, each firm will choose that
level of carpliance that nexiiuizes its profits. OSHA 's enforcenent activities
are geared towards penalizing firms that have not achieved the prescribed
safety standards. The finnisassuried to find its optimal caipliance level by
maximizing the following epected profit function at any tiire t:— 14—
(14)ir= NET(VP') —(IF)(VF) (p)
stereNE']? =firmrevenues minusallcosts except thosedueto finesfor
violationsof LENA standards,p = penaltyper violation, VP' =violationsper
firm, IF =inspectionsper finn and NET" <0.
An OSI violation refers to one iten of capital equipnent that does
rotconformto LENA's standards. Hence, iften machines are not in can-
pliarice, then LENA records ten violations. We use total industry violations
divided by the nuirber of firms in the industry as theneasure of the "viola-
tion rate" of the average firm in that industry and totalinspections in
the industry divided by the nuirber of firms as thenEasure of the average
firm's inspection probability. The reason for thisprocedure is that our
data set reports violations, penalties and inspections on thethree—digit
industry level only. Note that the specification in (14) assunes that
firms have rational expectations abcut OSHA •senforcenent activities.
The profit naxinüzing level of violations is given by:
(15) NCr'(VP')—(IF)(p)= 0
We can use this ajuation to generate predictions about the determinants of
the firm'sviolationrate:
a)Enforcenent
E4uation (15) indicates that an increase in the intensity of LE!Th
enforcatent, as nuasured by the probability of inspection, will induce the
firm to choose a lcer violation rate. Another iteasure of OSHA'5 enforcatent
efforts is its use of "failure to abate" penalties, whichare very large
penalties that are assessed against firms that do hot now into c*rplianoe— 15—
afteran inspector has issued a citation. We s'nfld expect that finns that
had a high ratio of FI'A penalties to general penalties in the previous
period are more likely to be in caipliance this period.
b)Catpliance Costs
A primary determinant of NE]?' and, hence, the firm's caipliance decision,
is the firm's marginal cost of cariplying with OSH standards. The marginal
cost of catpliance will differ across firms because of differences in their
production processes and technologies. Because of these differences sate
finns will be "naturally cauplying"andothers will be "naturally noncatplying."
Several variables can be used to proxy for the marginal cost of noncarpliance.
For exanple, se wuld expect the injury rate and the scrker ccnplaint rate
to be associated with the degree of ncincatpliance in the industry. Thirther,
industries that find it difficult to caiply win be more likely to contest
fines and, hence, less likely to remit the assessed penalties. We have infor-
mation on the percentage of penalties remitted and predict that this variable
will be negatively correlatai with the marginal cost of ccznpliance. Finally,
the Business Raindtable 's 1979 Report on the Cost of Government Regulation
documented the existence of large differences across industries in incremental
costs attributable to OSH regulations. The report showed that sate industries,
such as primary metals and chsnicals, have significantly high marginal costs
of caipli.ance. In our empirical analysis, s.e will use dumy variables for
these two industries.
c)Finn Size
Because of the definition of violations, a pure scale effect would
produce a one-to-one relationship between finn size and violations per finn.— 16—
Industrieswith a large average firm size, ho,.ever,tray have 1r narginal
costs of carpiiance if there are ecorunies of scale. ltldir the degree of
hazards constant, large firms may find iteasierto carply because of
their greater probability of arploying professionalsafety perscnnel (this
is because safety staffs are largely an overheadexpense). The existerce
of econcirijes of scale u1d lc the cfficient on firm size beliore
and mi4-it even riake it negative.
d)Past Ccrpliance
Cur nodal of the finn's rpliance decision assures that each period
the firm decides wheti-er or rct to caTe into carpliarce with CEHA's standards.
Since these standards are specifications that relate to the finn'scapital
stock, carpliance in one period is likely to affect carpliarce in sthsegtnt
periods, i.e. if the finn i-rodifies its equiprent in order to achieve can—
pliance, that rr.ification is likely to be pennarient. In other crds, the
firm's carpliance decision is rrore correctly vie in a dynamic caitext.
erefore, this period's carpliance decision is likely to be a function of
last period' s carpliarce (i.e. last period' s violation rate).
Given the predictions in (a) thraigh (d), .e can specify the violation
rate as a function of the inspection rate, the prortion of failure to
abate penalties, the injury rate, the carplaint rate, thepercentage of
penalties renitted, tv,o irdustry dznnies, average finn size, aid last year1 s
violation rate. tth, l-ccever, that violationsper finn are rct directly
observable. Violations of CEHA stardards are itch like victirriless crirres
in that they are rt autaratically reported, .it ratier trust be wvered.
and verified by inspections. Herce, rct violationsper finn (VP), ixrt
instead only registered violations R gei-trated by in.wticns Iare ctsezvable.— 17—
Thesevariables are related as follows:
(16) R= vr)I
We choose therefore to use registered violations per inspections (i.e. observed
rioncoripliance) as a proxy for violations per firm (i.e. actual rionccri-
pliance).
n additional conpiexity arises in that OSHA registers several
levels of violations of varying severity. For exanpie, in the first quarter
o f 1 9 7 9 ,nonseriousviolations received average penalties of $3,
serious violations and non sericas failure to abate notices received average
penalties of $450, repeat violations $550, serious failure to abate notices
$2000, and willful violations $5500.14 We have chosen to aggregate these
nunerous classes of violations by considering penalties per inspection (p),
rather than the various (RI) statistics. This penalty variable represents,
in effect, a ssighted average of noncaipliance rates for each industry.
C.Industrial Injury Rates
The purpose of OSHA enforcenent of its standards is, of course, to
reduce industrial injury rates. In order to cauplete the nxxel we need to
specify the determinants of the industrial injury rate. The problan is
to consider whether capliance with CElIA standards reduces the injury rate
below what it snld have been in the absence of CEliA. Recall fran our dis-
cussion of the finn's compliance decision that each firm chooses a safety
level that is based on the costs and benefits of cicrkers being injured on
the job. Given differences in technology and worker characteristics, sate
finns will be nore hazardous places at which to c,th than others.
Report Nuimber SF03, nthteograph, May 22, 1979.— 18—
Hencewe need to ncdel the firm's production function for worker
safety. In view of our data constraints, we will ntdel the average firm
in each industry. A substantial literature on industrial safety exists,
best sumnarized in Oi '5 1974 survey article. In enumerating tlxse
characteristics that are relevant to the determination of the injury rate,
our discussion relies, in part, on this literature.
(a)Firm Size
Oi has shown that the relationship between the injury rate and firm
size is an inverted -U.This is because in snail firms there is close
supervision by the managers which redi.es worker injuries while in very large
firms, econaies of scale in the use of professional safety staffs reduce
injury rates below the levels experienced in midsize firms. The functional
form we use to esti.rrate this relationship is:
(17) LO3(1½E) =cz(EF)+ S Lcx2(EF)
where cs c 0 and S >0.Note that the ratio —5/cs gives the firm size at
which the injury rate is maximized.
(b)Techncly
Variables which proxy the degree of hazard to which workers are
exposed belong in the industry' s production function for safety. Following
previa.is research, we use industrial characteristics such as percentage of
production workers, percentage of male workers, percentage of unionized
workers, percentage of professional eployees, and the labor/capital ratio
as measured by the ratio of labor costs (salariesplusfringes) to the value— 19—
ofshiprents in the industry. We also use the worker catplaint rate in
this coritext}5
(c}Dactgraphics
tharacteristics of the workforce such as education, the rate of new
hires arid the wage rate have been found to be significant determinants of
the injury rate because less educated and less experienced workers tend to
be accident-prone. Furtherrtre, percent white has been found to be
negatively correlated with injury rates because blacks' lower level of
s%ealth increases their willingness to accept risks.
(d)Workpace
vbrkplace injury rates are likely to be correlated with the amint of
overt LITS work since tired workers will be less careful in the operation of
machinery.
(e)ttrkiien' s Carpensat ion
Finally, an analysis of worker injuries nust take account of the role
played by the workntn' s ccrpensation systan. The benefit structure varies
across states and over tine, and previous reach (see Butler and trrall,
1982) has shown that reported injury rates are higher in those locations
and those years when benefit fornulas are the nost liberal. As explained
in Part III below, s construct two variables that capture the variation
in the availability of worlaten' s carp benefits for workers in different
industries.
15 recognize that the relationships between the injury rate and
percentage unionized, the laber/capital ratio and the worker caplaint
rate may be sin.iltaneous, but we treat the latter three variables as
cogenous to air nodel. Similarly, the wage rate is considered to be art
exogenous variable.— 20—
(f)Violations
Having specified all of these elarents of the firm's production
function for safety,can then measure the impact of caipliance with
OSHA standards by treating this variable as an additional input into the
production process. If caipliance with OSHA standards is, in fact, effec-
tive in reducing injury rates, then we should observe higher injury rates
in industries with higher P1, ceteris paribis.
1). Suririary
The structural equations for OSHA enforcement, industrial non-
ccupliance and vrker injuries are given bela.'. A ccuplete glossary of
variables is given in Table 1 and predicted signs are indicated in
parentheses underneath each variable.
(18) In (IF) =a+ c*11n (P1) + a2ln (AE) + cz31fl (EF)
(+) (+) (+)
+ a4]n (04P) + a5]n (1 + tiE) + a6ln (GDDHRF)
(+) (+) (+)
+ a7ln (QXHRF) +a8]fl (1+ FRfl) + +
a10D3O2




+ 841n(ElF) + B5ln (OW) + 861n (RNIT)
(<1) (+) (—)
+3.1PME'rAL + + 391n (PI)_1 +3101n(1+UE) + + c2
(+) (+) (+) (-)— 2].—
(20)in (AE) =+ y1ln(P1) + y2ln (EF) + y3(EF)
(+) (+) (—)
+y4in (04?) + y5ln (PICO) + y6ln (MALE)+ y7ln (PF)
(+) (+) (+) (—)
+ (1 +UF)+
y9mn(LCR) + y101n (WIUTE) +111th(EDUC)
(+) (—) (—) (—)
+Y]•2lfl (1 +NHR)+ y131fl (OVER) + 'r141n (JiPEZPN) +y151n(B)
(+) (+) (—) (+)




In order to estEtiate the behavioral relationships derivedin the
previous section, we rwuire data on the enforceintactivities of OSHh,
industrial injury rates and econanic and denugraphic characteristicsof
the industries. In this section we describe the data sourcesand
variable definitions.
A.OSHA flforcETeflt Activities
forcenent data for this study were thta.thed under contractfran




IF Inspections per firm1
P1 Penalties per inspection
Lost workdays per work
EF fliployees per finn
Conpiaints per enployee
tiE Percentage of employees that are unionized
GDDHPF Geographic "Herfindal-il index"ES whereSi =
theshare of employees in state i.
(cupational "Herfindahl index" ES? where Si =
theshare of enployees in occupatihri i.
PRFI' (Value added minus 1a1r costs) /assets
R1IT Ratio of penalties remitted to penalties
assessed
ETA Ratio of failure to abate penalties to
other penalties in the previous period
Average hourly earnings
Percentage of industry employees in District
of Coluirbia
MALE Percentage male employees
PD Percentage production workers
P)F Percent professional employees
ICR Lar cost ratio =lathrcosts/value of
shipEnts
WHITE Percent white employees
EWC Average education of employees
Mm Newhire rate
OVER Average vekly overthie hours
BEN Expected workitn' s cca'ipensation benefit (see text)
WAIT Expected waiting period for ?brIcn' 5 cctpensa—
tion benefits (see text)
Pt'tTPJL Dnny variable for primary metals industries
CHE24 Duimry variable for chemicals industries
D302 Dniry variable for S1C302-—Rubber and
plastics footwear
YRDUM Dumny variables for the various years
DISP Distrihitional variable for A/E equation:
(see text)
our data set, the nuirber of firms is actually measured by the
nunter of establishments.— 23—
threeways. First, only safety inspections and violations of safety
standards 'were tabulated. Health inspections and violations of health
standards 'were excluded. Since the link between occupational illness
and vRrkplace characteristics is very difficult to establish because of
tine lags and multiple causations of illness, 'we believe it is approp-
riate to focus on OSHA 's activities that pertain to occupational injuries.
Thasiuch as the vast majority of all lost vcrkdays are accounted for by
injuries (97 percent in 1977) and the vast majority of OSHA inspections
have been per forired by safety inspectors, the exclusion of health varia-
bles should not be vies as overly restrictive.16 seconWy, enforceirent
data are restricted to firms located in the 22 states where safety regü—
lations have been directly enforced by OSHA during the entire 1972-1979
period.17 Under provisions of the OSHAct of 1970, states nay retain
responsibility for developrent and enforcement of OSH standards. State
standards mast be "at least as effective" as national standards, and
adequate personnel must be assigned to enforcement. OSHA must delegate
the authority to those states sthnitting an acceptable program to the
Secretary of Labor, whereupon the Departtent of Labor may reiirburse up to
50 percent of State administrative and enforcatent costs. Unfortunately,
there are substantial differences in the relative vigor of federal and state
enforcarent efforts. Data provided by CElIA for this study indicate that
16Bureau of Labor Statistics, Cripational Injuries and fl].nesses in
1977: Satuary, U.S. GPO, Washingtcn, D.C., 1978
17Those states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Coluritia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hanptha.re, Gino, OkJ.ahcma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, ¶[xas and West Virginia.— 24—
federalinspectors each visit 60 percent fore takers than do state
inspectors, that federal inspections are alnost 3 tines as likely to cite
finns with serious violations as are state inspections, and thatfederal
fines per violation within ccrparable classes of violationare alnost
twice the rate assessed at the state level.18 Inlight of these profound
differences between federal and state jurisdictionswe have elected to
concentrate only on those states subject to the nore vigorous federal
enforcenent.
The C'SHA data set contains the following information for each of
the 3-digit industries for each of the years 1972-79 inclusive:
(1)Number of inspections
(2)Nunber of serious, willful and repeat violations
(3)Number of nonseriajs violations
(4)Thtal penalties for seriaxs, willful and repeat violations
(5)'ibtal penalties for nonseri.ous violations
(6)Failure-to—abate penalties
(7)Penalties ranitted
Table 2 provides saic sunna.ry statistics fran the OSHA datapertaining to
'manufacturing industries. In examining Table 2, it should be noted that
the 1972 data only refer to enforcextent activity for the last six nonths
of the year since records of activities during the first half of theyear
were not naintained. As Table 2 detonstrates, the annual number of OSHA
inspections peaked in 1974 and by 1979 had declined to half that level.
As columns (2) and (3) show, however, total penalties and, therefore,average
"Report Number SPO3," mineograph, May 22, 1979.— 25—
penaltiesper inspection, rose consistently through 1978. The explan-
ation for this upward trend in penalties can be seen in columns (4)
through (6). Violations that are classified as serious receive dramatic-
ally larer penalties than violations that are classified as nonserious.
Beginning in 1976, OSHA upgraded a large nunter of violations fran the
non ser iais status to the serious status; in addition, a iur±er of non-
serious violations were no longer recorded.
Hence, as colunn (6) shows, prior to 1977, between 1 and 5 percent
of recorded violations were serious while in 1977 the proportion rose to
.18 and continued to rise to .27 in 1978 and .3 in 1979. It is this shift
in policy that is responsible for the increase in the average penalty per
inspection in recent years. It is also responsible for the tine trend in
catpliance rates (defined as the percentage of inspections without any
recorded violations) sfnvn in colunn (7). Note that the post-1976 caxpliance
rate is above that of earlier years because sate nonserious violations were
no longer recorded. In stun, the data in Table 2 show that, over tine,
OSHA's inspection rates dropped while the average penalty per inspection
and the caipliance rate both rose as a result of a significant change in
09Th.' s policy of recording violations.
B.Oocupational Injury Rates
The Bureau of Labor Statistics is responsible for collecting and
dissEninating data on occupational injury rates. At our request, the 818
prepared a special tabulation of injury rates by three-digit SIC category,
for 1972 through 1978, just for finns in the 22 states we were anaiyzingJ9
19At the tine we made our datarequest, 1978 was the latest year for













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table3 presents aggregated data fran this file. Colunn (1) shows the case
rate, or the nunber of occupational injury cases per 100 full-tiRe
s.xirkers. Colunn (2) shows the incidence rate for lost workday cases only.
Note that while the total case rate in 1978 is below that of 1972, the lost
workday case rate is higher in 1978 than in the early years of OSHA enforce-
mant activities. The decline in this neasure (and the total rate) that
occurred around 1975 has been attri.bited to lathr market forces associated
with the recession (e.g. layoffs of inexperienced accident-prone sorkers).
As the data in colinin (3) show, lost workday cases accounted for 41 percent
of all cases in 1978 ccapared to 30 percent back in 1972. and, according
to coluixn (4), in 1978 manufacturing industries lost 87 days per 100 full—
tine workers because of occupational injuries; in 1972, the loss was con-
siderably stialler. In sum, the data in Table 3 show that the decline in
workplace injuries that occurred in the mid-70' s was reversed by a strong
upward trend.2°
C.Industrial Characteristics
Data on attributes of workers and firms have been collected fran
several sources. First, frau the nrp1cjnent and Earnings files of the
&ireau of Labor Statistics, we have obtained information for the 1972-78
period for each three-digit manufacturing industry, on percent prodtction
workers, percent male workers, average hourly earnings, average overt iRe
hours, and the new hire rate. As it proved inpossible for BLS to restrict
these variables to just the 22 states of our study, national values are,
of necessity, used.
should be noted that a conparison of the data in Table 3 with
nati.onal injury rate data indicates that in every year the figures for the
total case rate were locer in the region of federal enforcenent than for




Lost Proportion of Lost
Total WorkdayCases InvolvingWorkdays
Year Case Rate Case RateLost Workdays Rate
1972 14.29 4.19 .29 63.19
1973 14.67 4.44 .30 70.68
1974 14.31 4.58 .32 73.93
1975 12.74 4.37 .34 77.08
1976 13.09 4.76 .36 81.32
1977 13.05 4.97 .38 84.70
1978 13.23 5.40 .41 87.68
aData are onlyforfirmslocated in the22 federally-enforced states.
are ca].culat& per 100fun-tintcrkers.— 29—
Second,fran the current Pcpulation Survey, the following data on
worker characteristics were obtained: percentage unionized, the age
distribution of eployees, average education, percent white, and the
cecupational distribution of rp1oyees for each industry. At our request,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics prepared a special tabulation of these
data to include only those individuals who reside in the 22 states we are
studying. Since the CPS uses the Census industry codes we have matched
these codes with the SIC codes used in our other data sets.
Third, fran the Census Bureau's County Business Patterns tapes, we
obtained data on the nunber and size distribution (by aiployees) of
establisIttnts for each 3-digit SIC industry, for the relevant 22 states,
and for 1974 through 1978. Note that limited availability of this data
required our study to camence with 1974. Because of data limitations,
the nuirber of euployees in each industry and year had to be estimated
using the following fornila:
(21) Thtalnurrber— FM of workers
—iii i
where=ntnberof establishrinnts in size class i
M. =averageratio of workers to establishitcnts in size class i.
For the largest size class (with nore than 1000 workers in each establish—
merit), we assumEd that M equaled the average nuirber of employees for
national finns of ccztparable size in that industry. bbte thatis con-
stant across all industries except in the largest size class. The
industry—varying national average firm size for the largest size class
was obtained fran the published volunts of County Business Patterns.
The County Business Patterns data are also useful for correcting
for potential aggregation bias. Since all of our data are at the— 30—
three-digitindustry level rather than at the establishucritlevel, we
vculd like to beableto correct for the variation of establishrient
characteristics around the nean value for theindustry. Ckily for the
variable, average finn size, do we haveany information regarding the
variation around the rican. In view of thepostulated relationship
between finn size and the injuryrate, aggregation bias is nost likely
to be present in the lost vorkday equation.Using the postulated
relationship for each "fin":
(22) wi =(EFi)aexp(_SEFj)
where i refers to a size class we can derive theaggregated relationship
for the industry as:
(23) ln AE =aln(FT) - SEF+DIST
where DIST is given by the followingexpression:
(24) DIST =
Finally,ttc additional sources provided dataon industrial char-
acteristics. They are the Census Bureau's l½nnualSurvey of acturet-s,
which contains information on labercosts, value added, value of assets,
aid value of shipirents, and The aisinessPairidtable's Cost of Govenment
1qulation Study conducted by Pxthur Andersen & Co.This report contains
information on the increnenta]. costs incurredby ccznpanies in different
industries in catplying with OSHA regulations.
D.ctrlaen 's Caipensation Data
Cffe of the variables we use tocapture variations in the cr1aten '$
program is the expected benefit variable that was constructed— 31—
byRichard Butler and John Itrrall and used in their 1982paper. Their
variable, which is calculated for each of the 22 states in each of the
years 1974 through 1978, is an expected (as opposed to the actual)
benefit flea sure for a representative wage earner with aspouse and tsc
children who files a claim for a tezrporary total disability.2' We created
an expected benefit measure for each of the three—digit industriesby
calculating a weighted average of the Butler-WDrrall variables using the
geographic distribution of the errployees in the industry as the weights.
(Air second measure of variations in the woricien 'sccupensat ion program is
a weighted average of the waiting period for receipt of benefits again
using the geographic distribution to create the weights.
IV. Results
A.Methedology
(Air nc,del, expressed in equations (18), (19), and (20), has been
estimated using pooled cross section/tirre series data for threedigit
SIC manufacturing industries in the period 1974-1978 22facilitate
pooling, year dinny variables have been included in each equation for each
year except 1974, and penalties have been converted to a catuon 1974 base.
The latter step is necessary because reclassification of violationsby
OSHA caused recorded penalties per inspection to increase eachyear since
1974, as was demonstrated in Table 2. ¶DDconvertto a caittcn penalty
benefits sl-r,u].d not be used because that would create a
tauto].ogical relationship between injury rates and benefits.
22A Cl-ia, test of the nullhypothesis of equality of coefficients
across years could not be rejected for any equation at standard levels
of significance.— 32—
structure,penalties in each year were divided by the following deflaters






Estinationresults are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Variable definitions
are inTable1.
B.Inspections
The coefficient estimates in Table 4arelargely consistent with
predictions of the econcuic theory of regulation. The nost distinctive
features of this theory--organizational and wealth effects--appear to
be present and in sate cases quantitatively inportant. The positive and
significant coefficient on firm size indicates that the "organization"
effect sharply daninates the "dilution" effect when the nurrber of enployees
per firm increases, ceteris paribus. The findings for the herfindahi
neasures are mixed. The concentration of wrkers anong professions
has the expected positive effect on inspection rates, and is significant
at the ten pertent level, but geographic concentration has no significant
effect and is- improperly signed. A partial explanation for the
failure of the geographic variable nay be the positive correlation between
geographic and firm size concentrations of barkers (stall firms are nore
readily dispersed).
The negative and significant effect of unionization on the inspection
rate nerits extended cament. This effect does not appear to be a— 33—
Table4
Dependent Variable: In (Inspections Per Firm)
Independp Variable Coefficient t-value
.4348 (6.98)
P1 .2179 (3.36)












Cbnstant —6.116 ( —6.63)
.82
*Ml variables except It, D302, 075, D76, D77 and D78 are in logs.— 34—
statisticalaberration, as it is presentinother OSH enforcerrent
activities. Fbr exarple, a logit analysis of OSHA decisions to include or
exclude a three-digit SIC industry in the Target Industry Program (TIP)
which was the highlight of OSHA enforcenent efforts in 1972 yields the
following estimates:
(25)TIP=—.627+.11lnUE)—.O41UE—.OO81n(EF)
(—1.62) (3.01) (—3.20) (—.40)
Igain, OSHà targets less unionized industries with high accident rates.
The explanation for this unexpected finding ssvuld appear to lie in a
dual role of OSHA—to directly transfer wealth to rkers by enforcenent
actions in their own industries and to indirectly transfer wealth by
preserving union safety gains. The relatively greater inspection of
nonunionized industries uld raise the operating costs of those industries
to the level incurred by unionized industries that have noncatçetitively
determined safety levels. Thus OSHA in part acts like the minijitmi wage
to preserve the noncapetitive gains of collective bargaining.
Both expected wealth effects occur and are significant, although
the profit effect is only significant at the ten percent level.
effect of the accident rate is positive as predicted and highly significant.
The less intense inspection of sorkers in the District of Coluirbia is
as predicted. n interesting finding, which is not reported in Table 4, is
that use of a cniplete set of state dumies (against Florix5a) in the inspection
equation yielded estimates of al.iiost exactly zero for each state variable, except
for the predicted negative effect in D.C. and an odd, positive effect in Saith
Dakota. A Qxw test for the null hypothesis that all state &nnies except
these ts%O were zero could not be rejected at any reasonable level of— 35—
significance.In short, the pattern of OSHA i.nsçections across states
is, ceteris paribus, uniform. Any predictions (frau sate other itodel)
which uld be based on state-specific aspects, such as degree of 1Jberalin
or participation in certain Congressional oversight caauittees, thus could
not be sustained ty eie
Finally, note the pDsitive and significant coefficient on the dinny
variable for S1C302, tinter and plastics footwear. Although our equation
standardizes for many of the determinants of the inspection rate, .z still
observe an extraordinarily high inspection rate for this industry. At
present, we do not have a concrete eplanation for this finding.
C.Penalty auation
The major finding in Table 5 is the negative and significant coefficient
on the inspection probability, IF ,indicatingthe responsiveness of firms'
ccuplianoe decisions to CGHA's enforcexient efforts. Using the fact that
lagged penalties are included in the equation, the coefficients indicate
that the long run effect of a doubling of the inspection rate is to raise
ip1iarce by 47 percent. It should be noted that, as a consequence of corporate
risk neutrality, doubling penalties per violation holding the inspection
rate constant vciuld produce the sane 47 percent increase in caipliarte.
air second neasure of OSHA enforcerrent efforts, last period's ratio
of ETA penalties to general penalties, also has a negative effect on
penalties, but barely achieves significance.
23Ar1 interesting stuly of Federal Trade Carinission behavior which
did find effects of differential participation in Congressional oversight
aniittees is Weirigast and bbran (1981).— 36—
Table5




AE .4423 ( 5.43)
FM —.1968 (—1.30)
EF .4189 (4.92)












*Afl variables except PME'ThL, CHE4, 075, 076, 077 and D78are in logs.— 37—
As explained in Part II,aprizrarydeterminant of the firm's
ccztpliance decision is its narginal cost of caxplying with OSHA standards.
We have used several variables to proxy this marginal cost and all of these
variables have the expected effects. Note that canpliance is lower in
those industries with high lost rkday rates, high v.orker catplaint rates,
and low percentages of penalties remitted. Furtherriore, the industries
singled out by the Business Roundtable report on the costs of govenlEnt
regulation, prEriary netals and chemicals, have significantly higher pen-
alty rates.
The remaining resilts in Table 5 are generally consistent with our
expectations. The coefficient on finn size is sitive but significantly
less than one, indicating the existence of econauies of scale in ccvpliance.
The lagged penalty rate has a positive and significant coefficient on the
current penalty rate; last period's nodifications of the finn' s capital
stock will also affect this period's neasure of caupliance. Finally, note
that the union variable has no effect on caipliance.
D.lost W3rkday Etipation
The major finding in Table 6 is the positive and significant
coefficient on the penalty variable. This neans that as cacpliance in-
creases, the injury rate will drop. Note, however, that the magnitude of
the coefficient on P1 is quite snail. A ten percent reduction in non-
caxpliance sculd produce less than a one percent decline in injury rates.
Furthenitre, the penalty euati.on in Table 5 showed that this ten percent
reduction in noncczipliance could only be achieved if the inspection rate
were increased by 21 percent. !'bre inportantly, if caupliance were to
deuble, i.e. a 100 percent reduction in penalties occurred as all finns— 38—
Table6
Dependent Variable: In (Lost Workdays Per Worker)
Independent
Variabj.e* Cfficient t-value
P1 .0855 ( 2.01)






















*JQJ variables exceptEF,D75, D76, D77 and D78 areinlogs. Thisequation
also containsa vector ofregional duninies.— 39.—
noved into cxpliance, the injury rate would only fall by 8.5percent.
This nurrber is consistent with the 1974 findings of a panel of engineers
in the California Division of Industrial Safety that only 18.4 percent
of workplace injuries could have been prevented by a fully effective
governuent safety program.24 Md, as the coefficient on IF' in Table 5
implies, a doubling of caipliarce would require a 213 percent increase in
the inspection rate. In other words, to reduce the injury rate by a
mere 8.5percent,the inspection rate would have to triple. frbreover,
since the estimated elasticities are only valid at the margin, this 213
percent is likely to be a minimal estimate of the necessary increase in
inspections; in other words, as individual firms nove into ccvpliance,
would probably observe smaller and smaller reductions in the injury rate.25
The retaining coefficients in Table 6 are all consistent with our
predictions. The relationship between the injury rate and firm size is
an inverted-U with a peak at apprcothnately 120 workers. Also, injury rates
are positively correlated with percent production workers, percent male
aiployees, the new hire rate, percentage unionized, overtime hours and the
worker carplaint rate. They are negatively correlated with the education
of enployees, percent professional etployees, the wage rate, percent white
and the labor/capital ratio. The worlaten' s ccxrpensation program is also
an important determinant of reported injury rates. Injury rates are higher
in those industries where the workers have access to more liberal benefit
formulas and shorter waiting periods.
24See the references in footnote 7.
assumes that the relationship between AE andfor any given
firm is convex stile the observed relationship across industries is a con-
cave locus of points fran these individual curves.— 40—
V.Conclusions
This paper has developed and tested a node 1 of OSHA enforcenent
behavior, industrial caipliance and workplace injuries. As a result,
we have expanded upon previous research on HA in two ways. First we
have avoided the assuliption that OSHA randomly inspects industries and
instead found evidence that OSHA acts as a political institution that
gains support through the transfer of wealth fran firms to errployees.
second, by explicitly irodelling cclTlpliance, the paper has been able
to test two explanations for the apparent failure of OSHA to reduce
workplace injury rates. The first explanation is that, due to linited
statutory and budgetary authority fran Congress, OSHA is unable to carpel
industrial ccrpliance with its own standards. The second argurTent is that
the OSHPct itself is flawed, euphasizing standards for capital uiptent
when nost accidents in fact are caused by cczrplex epidaniological interactions
of labor, equipient and the workplace environnent. The enpirical results
slrw that finns do indeed trove taQards carp liance in response to CElIA's
enforcenent efforts. Increasing the inspection prthability or the penalty
per violation by ten percent would result in a statistically significant
4.7 percent increase in cczrpliance. But the connection between caipliance
with CElIA standards and workplace safety was found to be weaker. Fbr exanple,
even if all fins were to trove into catipliance, the lost workday rate
vaild only fall by 8.5 percent. Our findings sin.,, therefore, that the
elasticity of the lost workday rate with respect to the inspection prcbabiity
is only —.04.— 41—
Asdiscussed earlier, thisestimatedinpact of OS$1A enforcemant
is only valid at the margin. The presuned convexity of the VP-IF
and the AE-VF relationships inplies that the ratio of percentage reduc-
tions in lost workdays to percentage increases in inspections will
actually be less than .04, especially for large increases in enforcenent
efforts. Conversely, the estimated -.04elasticity understates the
effects of initial inspections, representing only the marginal itipact
of the last few inspection visits. An inrtant conclusion of the
econatetric work of this study then is that a 4 percent reduction in
lost workdays (within the 22 state region) represents a minbal estimated
achieverrent of the federal OSHA safety program.
While this finding is critical to any assessnent of OSHA, it mist
be supplenented with additional information in order for caprehensive
evaluation to be made. On the benefit side, the extent of OSHA inpact
on acoidentaJ. deaths and minor injuries remains to be conp.ited and the
entire range of health benefits is currently unknown. As regards can-
pliaxte costs for OSHA regulations, only fragnentary esthintes are
naw available, rrostly for nonrepresentative sanples of finns.26
overall cost-benefit study of the OSHA program is thus far beyond the
scope of our study.
Fbr the sake of perspective, however, it is useful to place the
estimated effect of (EllA on lost workdays within a rough cost-benefit
franetcrk. The crude and preliminary nature of air ccvputations will
26For a discussion of available data on ccripliance costs and
its limitations, see Zeckhauser and Nichols (1978), pp. 216—220.— 42—
bei.rmediately recognized, but this exercise both indicates the nature
of additional data needed and the probable outcone of any proper
assessint. Let us suppose that elimination of the OSHA program u1d,
based on our estimates, result in a 4percentincrease in lost
vsrkdays in the manufacturing sector in the 22-state region under federal
enhorceirent. If we value a lost 'workday at the average daily manufacturing
wage, $48.00, then for 1977 'wecalculatethebenefitfrom OSH to be
$10.8 million. Thequestion remainsasto the magnitudeofcaipliance
costs. We can approximate these costsbyusing the Business Roundtable's
1979 Report on the Cost of Governirent Regulation. That report estimated
that in1977,$94millionof incrarental costs wereincurredby participating
catpanies inthestudy inordertocarplywith OSHA safety regulations27
Let us assane thatthe participating carpanies are predominantly inthe
manufacturing sector and hence, conservatively, represent the entiretyof
manufacturingcaipliancecosts.28 menwedivide the $94millionby three
since the 22 statesrepresentone-thirdofnationalenploynent.We,
therefore, estimatethat thecosts due to CISHA safetyregulationsin
1977 were$31.3million in the 22-state region.
Stile bothbenefit and costestimates above arebiased downwards,
theysuggest thatthe OSHAsafety programin itscurrentformhasnot been
cost—beneficial.Promotion of workplace safety wouldbe moreeffectively
advanced at lower social cost through alternate strategies such as direct
27This figure nets outcostsdue to toxic and hazardous substances
regulations and occupational health and environnent control.
28thatonly48 cczrpanies participated in the study,accounting
for5 percent of national employment and 19 percentofnational corporate
assets. Hence, our estimate of manufacturing ccitpliance costs is extrezce].y
conservative.— 43—
provisionof information to workers, reform of worker compensation
procedures, and an Injury tax.Bibliography
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